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Energy Concern in China’s Policy-Making Calculation: 
From Self-reliance, Market-dependence to Green Energy 
 
Li Xing* and Woodrow W. Clark 
 
 
 
The paper intends to provide a framework of delineating the transformation of 
China’s development policy from a socialist self-reliance approach (1949-
1970s) to a market-oriented dependency (1970s-2008), then to an alternative 
sustainable path of socialism capitalism with a special focus on the green 
energy arena (2008- present). In the past decades China’s growing energy 
dependence has become a major concern for its economic and security 
policymakers which are expanding to link with foreign policy objectives. 
Since energy concerns have become a top priority of national security and 
policy legitimacy, China needs to rethink its development strategy and 
integrate green and renewable energy in policy-making calculations aiming at 
alternative or renewable energy (green) and sustainable development. The 
current trend is very promising because due to China’s new energy policy(s) 
it is leading the country and world to become a world leader in the research 
development, production and application of renewable energy.  
 
 
I. Introduction: from self-reliance to dependency 
The historical transformation from Maoist China to Dengist China since the end 
of the 1970s, contemporary China represents a sharp contrast as to the national 
policy objectives, political agenda, economic development, and more 
importantly development strategy. The Dengist China took the capitalist mode 
of economic development based on privatization of ownership and the means of 
production and distribution, to the marketization and allocation of resources 
including the total acceptance of economic inequities and political privileges. 
The basis of this capitalism put emphasis on market-oriented science and 
technology as the essential productive forces, along with the promotion of the 
interests of the privileged, professional and entrepreneur classes, to also include 
the commercialization of welfare and social security. The 1970s was the period 
in which western capitalism, promoted by the UK and USA became the norm 
for over three decades (Economist, 2009). More significantly and in connection 
of this paper, what China has witnessed in the past three decades is an economic 
growth path based on energy-consumption. 
 
…………………… 
*  Li Xing is Associate Professor at Aalborg University, Denmark and can be reached at: 
xing@ihis.aau.dk 
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During the socialist period, due to historical reasons, China took a development 
course with a commitment and goal by emphasizing human capacity, economic 
equality and balance, thereby mobilizing social and economic resources in 
pursuit of self-reliance development strategy. No matter how the socialist 
strategy is interpreted and assessed from today’s perspective, it was historically 
the only option if China wanted to sustain its economic development, national 
security and maintain its independence. The strategy of self-reliance emphasized 
the primacy of internally-generated independent development not only at the 
national level, but also at the provincial, regional and local levels. The national 
five-year plans started under Mao continued. This internally-generated 
independent development was reflected in the institutional structure of each 
unit1, where the multi-functions of party leadership, production planning, 
medical service and resource demand and supplier controls were closely 
integrated. Self-reliance under such a socio-economic structure in which politics 
- economics - service - and supply existed together at the unit level, created a 
sustainable society based on their own resources and needs and under the overall 
guidance of the state’s five year plans.  
 
The socialist China’s choice of self-reliance and self-sufficiency development 
path was projected as a potential “ideological threat” by the capitalist bloc, 
because the central goal of the socialist politics with specific plans from the 
central government, were seen as an attempt to challenge the capitalist ideology 
of competition that would reduce costs but unfortunately also lead to an 
inequitable hierarchy in the world order. Seen from the interpretation of the 
world system theory, the socialist self-reliance and self-efficiency policy aimed 
at transforming the basic logic of capitalism. However  in reality it was actually 
designed toward a nation-wide mobilization for industrialization for the purpose 
of catching up with the core advanced capitalism that reward people with 
money, no matter where the funds or by means the funds were acquired. This is 
because socialist states were still operated within the capitalist world economy, 
and the dynamics of capitalism was capable of distorting and limiting national 
economic planning, leading to the constraints of their policy options (Chase-
Dunn, 1982, 1999). Nevertheless, such a socialist project based on self-reliance 
existed outside the US-led capitalist world economic system. In other words, it 
was merely an ideological challenge without being able to construct a 
sustainable alternative model (or paradigm based on recent historical evidence) 
to replace the capitalist system.  
 
                                                 
1   A unit, in Chinese “Dan Wei,” refers to any functional organization, for example, a 
ministry, a university, a company, a factory, etc. A “Dan Wei” was self-managed “mini-
welfare state” combing supply, demand and welfare. 
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In addition, the Chinese self-reliance policy was also a response both to the 
internal constraints of socio-economic backwardness and the external pressure 
by the US-led economic blockage and trade embargo after WWII and the 
Korean War as well as from the failure of China’s dependent relations with the 
Soviet Union since the Republic was founded in 1949. What should be pointed 
out here is that China’s emphasis on self-reliance and independence in the 
Chinese energy industry was primarily derived from the lessons of the Sino-
Soviet split in which China was deprived not only of the Soviet technicians and 
specialists that were helping China develop its industries, but also of around 
50% of its oil supplies that were imported from the Soviet Union (Downs, 2000: 
11-12).  The discovery of Dajing2 oil field at the end of 1950s was declared to 
mark the end of China’s oil external dependence both for defense and civilian 
applications.  
 
The post-Mao transformation of policy orientation form socialism to market-
capitalism with its objectives, have their roots in the change of the regime’s 
perceptions of the external environment of international political economy since 
the 1980s and especially due to the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The 
perceptions were generated from the conceptualization of international relations 
that, 1) the superpowers, including their respective alliances, were exhausted in 
their endless competition, leading to a situation where no major serious conflict 
was likely in the future. On the other hand, there would be the emergence of 
non-conventional security challenges; 2) economic development became the key 
objective for all nations and economic power thus emerged to become more 
important and relevant than traditional military strength. Thus soon, China had 
to face economic interdependence; 3) the post-Cold War US-based and 
controlled uni-polar order or American-centric new world order would likely 
remain for a period of time, yet unknown,. Therefore, China should, in the 
words of Deng, “observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, 
hide our capacities and bide our time”; and 4) there would be growing global 
competition for natural resources and energy security. It was this last area that 
became after the turn of the 21st Century China’s unknown challenge and hence 
significant task (Clark and Isherwood, 2007). 
 
Driven by the above strategic understanding, China has been pursuing a global 
foreign policy which was directed at creating a stable and peaceful environment 
for its economic growth through active engagement with the West and with the 
surrounding regions. China grasped opportunities for increasing international 
trade and foreign direct investment, and more importantly for securing the 
access to natural resources and energy supplies through its own international 
                                                 
2  Daqing was the largest oil field in China, and it is located in Heilongjiang province. It 
was discovered in 1959 and the production started in 1960. 
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trade and investment in the resource-rich regions such as Africa, Latin America 
and Southeast Asia, and in recent years, Central Asia. China’s global policy 
strategies under an active role of the state have been seen as effectively making 
it one of the “globalization’s great winners” (Thøgersen and Østergaard, 2010). 
 
China’s remarkable achievement in economic growth was made possible by its 
growing involvement in the capitalist world system. But China remained in 
charge with caution and intense controls from the central government. In other 
words, China’s economic growth is inseparable from its increasing dependence 
on global markets, with some estimates suggesting that more than 40% of its 
GNP is derived from international trade. In other words, China’s rapid economic 
growth has been driven by exports with the assistance of foreign investments 
and joint-ventures which have dominated the most dynamic sectors of the 
economy. The market-driven growth encourages more concessions to induce 
capital flows and growth in unlimited possibilities of expansion and more 
structural changes to meet the demand of the overwhelming pursuit of external 
markets and resources. In addition, the integration with the world market is 
followed by over-dependence of the productive forces on the fluctuations of the 
world market. The most affected area is China’s energy demand and supply. 
 
II. The real predicament: energy-consumption-based economic growth 
During the past three decades, China’s GDP has enjoyed an average growth rate 
of 9-10%. Since 2002, China’s energy consumption has been growing at a faster 
rate than its GDP growth. From 2000 to 2005, China’s energy consumption rose 
by 60%, accounting for almost half of the growth in world energy consumption 
(Downs, 2006:1). In 2004 China contributed 4.4% of total world GDP, whereas 
China also consumed 30% of the world’s iron ore, 31% of its coal, 27% of its 
steel and 25% of its aluminum. Between 2000 and 2003, China’s share of the 
increase in global demand for aluminum, steel, nickel and copper was, 
respectively, 76%, 95%, 99% and 100%. On a global scale, an increase in the 
rise of personal car ownership alone could mean an extra billion cars on the road 
worldwide within the next 10 years. As a report by Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences describes the mounting worldwide impact of China’s resource 
consumption: 
 
China is currently the world’s third largest energy producer and the second 
largest energy consumer. In 2002, China accounted for 10% of total world 
energy use and is projected to account for 15% of global energy use by 2025. 
China is the world’s largest coal producer accounting for 28% of world coal 
production and 26% of total consumption. China is the third largest consumer 
of oil and is estimated to have the world’s sixth largest proven reserves of oil. 
China has roughly 9.4% of the world’s installed electricity generation 
capacity (second only to the United States) and over the next three decades is 
predicted to be responsible for up to 25% of the increase in global electricity 
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generation. China emitted 10.6% of global carbon emission from fossil fuels 
in 1990 (second only to the United States) and 14.2% in 2003. This share is 
projected to rise to 22.2% by 2020 IEA, 2006). (CASS, 2006: 28) 
 
This situation has given rise to problems of net energy imports, environmental 
pollution and ecological destruction, cross-border pollution, and mounting 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions: 
 
The domestic environment has deteriorated rapidly, with some 70% of urban 
population exposed to air pollution, 70% of seven major water systems 
heavily polluted, over 400 cities short of water, and 3,400 km2 (equivalent to 
Japan’s Tottori Prefecture) turning into desert every year. Cross-border 
pollution, notably acid rain and sandstorms, have reached the Korean 
Peninsula and Japan. Global environmental problems: China is the world’s 
second-largest CO2 producer after the U.S. (Li, Zhidong, 2003: 1) 
 
China’s escalating energy consumption is placing heavy pressure on the world’s 
energy prices. Chinese energy demand has more than doubled during the past 
decade. According to the study of Konan and Jian (2008), China will consume 
about 41% of global coal consumption and 17% of global energy supply by 
2050. Metal prices have increased sharply due to strong demand, particularly 
from China which has contributed 50% because of the increase in world 
consumption of the main metals (aluminum, copper, and steel) in recent years. 
Due to its rapid growth and rising share in the world economy, China is 
expected to retain its critical role in driving commodity market prices (World 
Economic Outlook, September 2006). China is willing to offer above world 
market prices for purchasing raw materials, which attributes great comparative 
advantages to the developing world. 
 
Historically, the world has been already burdened by the high energy 
consumption by the West, particularly by the United State. Today China’s 
growing appetite for international trade drives its mounting demand for 
resources to sustain its economic growth and to fuel its countless development 
projects. China has already become the world’s largest importer of a range of 
commodities, from copper to steel and crude oil. The phenomenal rise of 
commodities prices worldwide in recent years is claimed to be attributed to 
China’s growing import demand. Some even worried that there would not be 
enough resources in the world, for example gas and oil, to satisfy the ever 
increasing demand driven by China’s economic growth. Furthermore, taking 
China’s neighbour – India – into consideration with its population of 1 billion, it 
will add double pressures on the demand for the same resources.  
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After a short period of self-sufficiency in energy supply especially in petroleum, 
China became a net importer of petroleum in 1993 and it took only a few years 
before that China became the second largest oil importer and consumer after the 
United States in 2003. China’s energy profile used to be heavily weighted 
towards fossil fuel technologies (petroleum and coal) at a time when reductions 
are urgently needed to stabilize global climate change. Based on the 2008 
statistics from the International Energy Agency, the growth rate of China’s 
energy consumption and its share of the global total final consumption are 
comparably much higher than the rest of the world. 
 
Figure 1. Shares of total final consumption 1973 and 2006  
                                          
 
Source: International Energy Agency (2008) Key World Energy Statistics, p. 30 
 
It is foreseeable that China’s resource import of oil and gas will continue to 
increase if its targeted economic growth is to be maintained. The implication is 
therefore clear that not only global commodity price and international 
geopolitical power relations will be affected but also China’s international 
politics, such as its foreign policy rationale, international aid objective, arms sale 
consideration and compulsory expansion of its long-range naval power 
projection capabilities, will be closely connected energy economic issues. The 
rise of China as a key actor in energy consumption is forcing the current 
international energy regime to adjust or modify its established rules of the 
capital market game. This is because the international energy regime “is 
influenced not only by economic, political, and social factors of resource-rich 
countries but also by international political factors, particularly change in the 
international balance of power, adjustment of relationships among countries and 
changes to international rules (Xu, 2007: 6). 
 
However, one of the key challenging questions raised here is whether the global 
ecological system is on the verge of reaching the limit, and whether the 
expansion of global resource consumption is ecologically possible. The 
consequences facing China are very severe, and the Chinese growth model 
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would face a fundamental challenge because the peak of resource exhaustion 
and the imperativeness of ecological sustainability would impose severe limits 
to its future economic growth, hence fundamental social changes will be 
inevitable (Li, Mingqi, 2010). 
 
Figure 2A. World primary energy supply (million tones of oil equivalent, 1950-2100) 
Figure 2B. China’s primary energy supply (million tones of oil equivalent, 1950-2100) 
            A    B 
    
(Li, Minqi, 2010: 128, 130) 
 
Figure 2A and 2B calculate and project the peak period of both the global and 
China’s primary energy supply: 
 
World oil production is projected to have peaked in 2008. World natural gas 
production is projected to peak in 2041. World coal production is projected to 
peak in 2029.  Nuclear energy is projected to grow according to IEA’s 
“Alternative Policy Scenario”. Long-term potential of the renewable energies 
is assumed to be 500 EJ (12,000 million tonnes of oil equivalent).  The 
world’s total energy supply is projected to peak in 2029. (Li, Minqi, 
2010:128) 
……………. 
China’s coal production is projected to peak in 2030, oil production to peak in 
2016, and natural gas production to peak in 2046.  China’s long-term 
potential of nuclear and renewable energies is assumed to be 1,000 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent…. China’s energy imports are assumed to keep 
growing from now to 2020 to sustain rapid economic growth. The Chinese 
economy is assumed to keep growing at an annual rate of 7.5 percent from 
2010 to 2020.  By 2020, China’s energy imports are projected to grow to near 
700 million tonnes of oil equivalent, comparable to the current US energy 
imports.  After 2020, China’s energy imports are assumed to stay at 8 percent 
of the rest of the world’s total fossil fuels production. China’s total energy 
supply is projected to peak in 2033. (Li, Minqi, 2010: 130-131) 
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Clark and Isherwood (2010) found this pattern in the study of Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region (IMAR) for the Asian Development Bank in 2007. IMAR 
is the second largest coal producing region in China and the use of renewable 
energy (solar and wind in particular) to transition from the environmental 
problems caused by coal, China needed to provide public policies in its next five 
year plan for sustainable development with the financial resources. Today, the 
IMAR is developing such renewable energy resources while controlling its coal 
production through advanced coal technologies that are “cleaner”. 
 
III. The rise of China in the context of energy dependency 
In order to keep the economic growth rate, China has to make the access to 
adequate energy supplies as a national priority and to a great extent a national 
security priority. China is perhaps one of the few countries that regard energy 
security as a vital component of their national interests. Currently China is “the 
world’s second largest consumer and third largest producer of primary energy. 
There is no sign that China’s energy consumption will slow down, on the 
contrary, it will steadily increase. Thus for energy consumption to keep pace 
with its targeted economic growth at a moderate rate of 8-9%,  China will have 
to utilize every fuel source available including investment on renewable energy 
and the expansion of nuclear power. It is expected that China’s import of energy 
resources will increase at a steady rate particularly from Russian natural gas and 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) shipped through Chinese seaports which are both 
difficult options (Clark and Isherwood, 2010).  
 
China’s growing interest in resource-rich regions such as Africa, Latin America, 
Middle East, Central Asia and Southeast Asia is no doubt linked with its energy 
security consideration. How will the rapidly increasing demand for energy, raw 
materials, and other natural resources shape Chinese policies towards its 
international relations especially with resource-rich countries? Can China afford 
depending on global energy markets, either via exclusive bilateral deals, or 
direct investment in resource exploration in order to sustain its economic 
growth? What strategies will China use to secure its share of the global resource 
market? To find the answers to these questions, it is of importance to take an 
energy security approach to explore the geopolitical, economic, energy, and 
environmental implications behind China’ rapidly growing energy challenges 
and to understand the Chinese anxiety and concern with issues of energy 
security in attempting to search for new sources of energy supply. China’s 
economic and foreign policy behaviors are increasingly influenced by growing 
energy consideration. As the world’s second largest economy and trading nation, 
China’s hunter for energy and its global strategies for energy security have led 
to heavy debates and even in some cases have resulted in political conflict. 
China is predicted by some economist to be the number one economy and 
trading nation within the next decade. The West has been expecting that ideally, 
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China’s energy vulnerability might drive it toward cooperation with rival oil 
consuming nations through participation in multilateral organizations and other 
forums. Since energy security is no doubt playing a more decisive role in 
Chinese foreign policy, Beijing’s relations with both the existing major energy-
consuming powers and energy-exporting countries will shape its motivation and 
justification on energy issues as well as on non-energy issues.  
 
In recent years, China’s “going-out” economic and foreign policy encouraged its 
National Oil Companies (NOCs) to try to acquire some western oil companies 
but still secure the control over the access to some overseas energy supplies 
including purchasing equity stakes in foreign oil companies. This strategy has 
been regarded as “mercantilist” in the West and particular in the United States 
where the attempt of a Chinese NOC to buy out the American oil corporation 
UNOCAL in 2005 triggered political backlash in the US Congress causing the 
final withdrawal of the Chinese company. The incident indicates the lack of trust 
of the US in China’s energy diplomacy, because the Chinese move was 
interpreted as undermining American energy security. 
 
In the studies of China’s energy security with its economic and foreign policy, a 
number of geo-politically vital areas cannot be disassociated with China’s 
efforts to maintain both energy security and good international relations within 
these regions and with the major western powers. China’s energy diplomacy 
with the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia, the Asia-Pacific, Africa and 
Latin America are become a global topic, and Beijing’s efforts toward greater 
energy security through multilateral organizations are discussed. It is still too 
early to predict whether the world is to witness the evidence supporting the 
liberal hypothesis that economic interdependence promotes international 
cooperation, or confirming the realist conviction that competition and power 
accumulation will eventually lead states to conflict and war as history has shown 
in the past. Energy demand is seemingly accelerating China’s “peaceful” rise to 
global prominence, and moderating the conflictual aspects of Chinese foreign 
policy. 
 
China has been struggling to develop and promote good relationships with 
under-developed regions which contain potential energy reserves, such as Africa 
and Latin America, through its unique international aid system linking 
development aid and trade with energy suppliers. Recently China has aimed to 
prepare for technological advances and changes of climatic circumstances which 
will bring maritime transport in the Arctic waters to make possible the linking of 
North Atlantic and the North Pacific into close commercial relations. It is 
expected that China will increasingly strengthen its political economy of 
international relations in the Arctic region and speed up its research through its 
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polar research bases in the Antarctica. In addition, China is adopting different 
policy strategies and objectives to different regions. 
 
Africa and Latin America: Comparing with other regions in the world, these two 
regions are seen as relatively stable markets as energy suppliers. China’s central 
policy objectives in Africa and in Latin America are stated clearly in its policy 
papers - China's African Policy Paper (2006) and Latin American policy paper 
(2008). The policy objectives are aimed at strengthening diplomatic and political 
ties with these two resource-rich regions while at the same time securing and 
diversifying energy supplies and other raw material resources including the 
opening of these region’s commodity markets. Currently, China is one of the 
key investors in Africa and its trade and investment relations in Latin America 
are going to accelerate in the coming years. China’s increasingly dynamic 
economic relations with these regions are seen by some western critiques as 
challenging the traditional ties between these regions and their historical 
colonial ties with the western powers. Intensification in China-African and 
China-Latin American trade relations also accelerated the “neo-colonialist” 
argument claiming that China’s is imposing the regions with a renewed 
“colonial” relationship. However, despite the criticism on China’s energy-
oriented policy in its economic and political relations with the two regions, the 
Chinese style of approach and engagement especially its aid policy and practice 
has indeed a far-reaching long-term and permanent realignment of power 
relations in the conventional international aid system and has already changed 
the system in many ways (Opoku-Mensah, 2010). 
 
Middle East and Central Asia: These two regions are world’s most unstable 
energy markets. China has gradually emerged as one of the regions’ main 
partners. China’s emerging presence in the regions is seen as one of the major 
geopolitical changes in the aftermath of demise of the Soviet Union’s and the 
consolidation of China’s new power (Peyrouse, 2007). The two regions are now 
set to play a major part in China’s energy policies and in the war against the 
separatists in China’s northwestern region. The economic and political rise of 
Chinese has a great implication in the two regions in terms of the reinforcement 
of China’s policy objectives and the reinforcement of the geopolitical alliance 
embedded in the strategic calculation of energy security. Currently the Iran-
nuclear issue is testing China’s foreign policy orientation in the context of its 
energy security consideration. China-Iran partnership has grown out of mutual 
need for products, ranging from arms and technology to consumer goods and 
China’s soaring need for energy supplies (Dorraj and Currier: 2008, 70). Thus, it 
has been a painful foreign policy decision for China to lend support to the USA-
led UN sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, fearing the grave consequence 
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that this might lead to loss of one of its major energy suppliers3. China is being 
torn between the imperative need for energy on the one hand and the US 
pressure on its role as “responsible stakeholder” and “strategic reassurance”.4 
 
The enlarging discrepancy between energy demand and domestic supply is 
driving China to reply on a number internal and external policy choices in order 
to keep the planned growth rate, a tendency which makes it politically 
vulnerable to economic setbacks.  Firstly, China has to put huge investments 
into discovering oil and natural gas resources in the Western part of the country 
despite the burdens of massive capital investment, high production costs, 
infrastructures, environment and geological risks. Secondly, China has to 
depend on unstable Persian Gulf areas and other crude oil suppliers in Africa 
and Central Asia where civil wars, geopolitical risks and socio-political conflicts 
are unavoidable. Even if the energy supply sources are secure, the transportation 
issue is becoming another headache for China. In the case of its neighbours, 
China can construct an oil and natural gas overland pipeline from Central Asian 
and Russia. Cross-land pipeline options were already put on the highest 
negotiation table between China, Russia and other Central Asian countries.  
 
In connection with its rising energy import, the transport of energy products has 
been the lifeline of China’s economic development. China’s coastal line areas 
are the heart of its economic growth and the frontier of its international trade. 
China’s growing maritime ambitions which already boasts the world’s fourth 
largest merchant fleet, contributes 6.8% to global tonnage (UNCTAD, 2005). 
However, in the aftermath of 9.11, the security landscape of international trade 
and maritime transport changed significantly. The challenges facing global 
maritime security are increasingly of a nontraditional nature, such as terrorist 
acts against shipping, trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, armed pirate 
robbery as well as smuggling of people and arms. Pirates and Islamist terrorist 
groups have long operated in those water areas, including the Arabian Sea, the 
South China Sea, and in waters off the coast of western Africa. Since 2008, the 
Chinese government has dispatched warships to the waters off Somalia to 
protect Chinese vessels and crews from pirate attacks. The Chinese fleet would 
                                                 
3  According to data released by the General Administration Agency (GAC) Iran supplied 
11.3 per cent of China’s energy consumption in 2009 (adapted from People’s Daily 
Online, 10 February 2010).  
4  “Strategic reassurance”, coined by James Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State in a 
conference sponsored by the Center for a New American Security, states that “China 
must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not 
come at the expense of security and well-being of others.” Its implication can be seen as 
Obama Administration’s China-policy successor to the Bush Administration's 
“responsible stakeholder” policy framework coined by former Deputy Secretary of State, 
Robert Zoellick, who is now the President of the World Bank. 
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join warships from the U.S., Denmark, Italy, Russia and other countries in 
patrolling the Gulf of Aden, which leads to the Suez Canal. Currently this is the 
quickest route from Asia to Europe and the Americas. This is a remarkable 
foreign policy change from a home-based passive defense to an offshore-based 
“preventive defense” which is directly linked and coordinated with the western 
developed nations for their collective energy security. 
 
From an internal perspective, energy security has become the essential premise 
for China to achieve its national goal of quadrupling its gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2020. There is a genuine consensus among Chinese leaders and 
scholars that energy has become a key strategic issue for China’s economic 
development, social stability, and national security and that the realization of 
China’s key national interests5 is highly dependent on the access to sufficient 
energy resources (Liu 2006, Zhang, 2006). China’s “market economy” has 
locked itself in a “tiger-riding dilemma”, i.e. any slow-down in economic 
growth would put the country in a risky situation, leading to social unrest and 
political illegitimacy (Li and Clark, 2009). China’s government fears that 
domestic energy shortage and rising energy cost could undermine the country’s 
economic growth and thus seriously jeopardize job creation. Beijing 
increasingly stakes its political legitimacy on economic performance and rising 
standards of living for its people. Consequently, the threat of economic 
stagnation due to energy shortage represents real risks of social instability, 
which could in turn threaten the continued political authority of the state and the 
Communist Party. Energy security is a basic strategic political concern for the 
leadership. 
 
In fact, some scholars of energy politics point out that state-led pursuit of energy 
supplies is often seen as the source of international conflicts. However, behind 
it, other sources of conflict – nationalism, geo-political competition, competing 
territorial claims – are most likely to have been at the root-cause of those 
conflicts (Hogan in Constantin, 2005). One Chinese scholar of strategic studies 
clearly explains the reason why energy security has become a core component of 
China’s national interest: 
 
With external trade accounting for almost 50 percent of China’s economy, 
China is now highly interdependent with a globalized market. This shift also 
includes hard social, political and geopolitical choices that deeply impact 
matters of national security. The more developed China becomes the greater 
its dependence grows not only on foreign trade but also on the resources to 
                                                 
5  China’s national interests are defined by the government as including sustained economic 
growth, the prevention of Taiwanese independence, China’s return to as a global power 
status, and the continuous leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Today 
energy security is defined as a core part of China’s national interests. 
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fuel the economy. With these complex and expanding interests, risks to 
China’s well-being has not lessened but has actually increased, making 
China’s national security at once both stronger and more vulnerable. (Zhang, 
Wenmu, 2006) 
 
China’s sensitivity on the confluence of geo-politics and resource politics is also 
derived from the fact that historically China has been a weak sea power. One of 
China’s key weaknesses through centuries of its development and into the 
modern age is its lack of a strong navy to safeguard its global interest and this is 
perhaps one of the major factors leading to China’s massive investment on 
raising and modernizing its naval capabilities. China therefore has good reasons 
for acquiring an aircraft carrier to enable it to protect its national interests (Cole, 
2006 and Nødskov 2008). China has territorial disputes in the South China Sea 
over the Spratly Islands with neighbouring countries and is also worried about 
the security of the major maritime transportation routes through China transports 
the majority of its foreign trade, as well as its oil imports upon which it is totally 
dependent. Based on the historical lessons, China has a clear understanding on 
the linkage between its energy security and international geo-politics, which is 
spelt out clearly by one scholar:  
 
The history of capitalism and its spread globally have shown that it is often 
accompanied by cruel competition between nation states. Those countries that 
lose out are not necessarily economically or technologically underdeveloped 
or those with a low level of culture. Rather, they are most often those nations 
who forgo the need to apply their national strength to national defense and 
therefore do not possess sufficient strategic capability. (Zhang: 2006:17) 
 
Today the rise of China is due in large part to its rapid emergence as a major 
force in world energy markets and energy geo-politics. Beijing’s booming 
energy consumption and heavy investment for energy security have raised a new 
range of contentious issues between China and other world powers that are 
adding a new layer of issues to already complex and dynamic relationships. 
China’s economic growth is supported by three primary pillars: 1) export-led 
growth; 2) real property growth; 3) government spending; and among them 
export has been the key engine driving its economic growth. The current global 
financial crisis (2008-2009) has already indicated the break-down of the first 
pillar because European and especially American consumers can no longer 
consume at the debt-supported levels as they had in the past. One of the 
perplexing questions is whether the sustainability of China’s export oriented 
development strategy can be counted on to be sustainable and reliable into the 
future. 
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IV. Change of growth strategy and promoting sustainable energy 
Energy and environmental problems in China should be resolved primarily 
through self-reliance efforts, but also through international cooperation. In order 
to diversify access to energy supplies and reduce dependency on certain 
exporters, China is taking many political and economic measures and providing 
economic aid to strengthen its cooperative relations with resource-rich countries 
(Tseng, 2008; Ziegler, 2006). However, the dynamic debates on energy security 
are still going on in China (Downs, 2004). Certain indications can be drawn 
from the debates, that many of China’s analysts and policy-maker are not fully 
convinced of the benefits of reliance on world energy markets. The political 
consensus today is to move  towards “green” (renewable energy power 
generation) and integrated energy infrastructure systems that are sustainable.  
 
In addition, China has been alert at the soaring demand in global energy in 
recent years and at the possibilities of long-term global energy shortage. Hence, 
China’s energy security will be one of the most important parts of its broader 
foreign policy in the years to come. The world will soon focus on China’s new 
economic and energy policies, its energy market reform and its new strategies in 
meeting the political challenges of rising energy costs and environmental 
pollutions (Clark and Xing, 2003). Much global attention will be given on 
China’s move towards technology development and innovation in generating 
clean coal, natural gas power along with new institutional developments. 
Chinese energy policies and each of China’s steps and practices bear significant 
implication on greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. 
 
Already being burdened with serious environmental problem and energy 
shortage, the on-going global economic downturn presents China with a historic 
opportunity to rethink its growth strategy to move towards a more stable and 
sustainable path. Today, a promising optimism is that China seems to be firmly 
committed to the creation of a largely self-sustaining innovation system as part 
of a knowledge-based economy of the future. China is sparing no effort to meet 
its 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010) energy-conservation goals, in which China 
will cut its per unit of GDP energy consumption by 20 percent from 2005 levels 
by the end of 2010. 
 
 
Figure 3
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policy measures, tax-related incentives, custom duties, and pricing incentives. 
Some concrete policy incentives are: 1) connecting “intermittent”6 sources of 
electricity like wind or solar to the national grid; 2) connecting utilities 
mandated to open transmission lines to renewable generators, with ratepayers 
bearing part of the extra costs; 3) feed-in tariffs guaranteeing renewable energy 
producers a steady, high price for electricity so as to enable them to compete 
with coal producers; 4) tax breaks, preferential loans, and other financial 
incentives encouraging investors to support renewable ventures (ChinaFAQs, 
2010). 
 
It is likely that China will meet and even exceed its renewable energy 
development targets for 2020 with applying other alternative energies including 
hydro, wind, biomass, and solar PV power. It is expected that more than one-
third of China’s households could be using solar hot water by 2020 if current 
targets and policies are continued (Martinot and Li, 2007). China expects the 
policy objectives to be reached through the integration of a number of 
relationships: the responsibility of the state and the obligation of the public, 
institutional promotion and market mechanism, current demand and long-term 
development, and domestic practice and international experience. 
 
In recent years China has won the global recognition for its achievement in the 
development and application of alternative energy. China overtook the United 
States for the first time in 2009 in the race to invest in wind, solar and other 
sources of clean energy. American clean energy investments were $18.6 billion 
last year which were a little more than half the Chinese total of $34.6 billion. 
Just a few years ago, China’s investments in clean energy totaled just $2.5 
billion (Los Angels Times, March 25, 2010). In recent years, it is increasingly 
recognized that China’s “green leap forward” policy has made it become the 
world’s largest makers of wind turbines and solar panels surpassing Western 
competitors in the race for alternative energy. As one of the key US newspapers 
points out:  
 
China vaulted past competitors in Denmark, Germany, Spain and the United 
States last year to become the world’s largest maker of wind turbines, …. 
China has also leapfrogged the West in the last two years to emerge as the 
world’s largest manufacturer of solar panels. And the country is pushing 
equally hard to build nuclear reactors and the most efficient types of coal 
power plants. These efforts to dominate renewable energy technologies raise 
the prospect that the West may someday trade its dependence on oil from the 
Mideast for a reliance on solar panels, wind turbines and other gear 
manufactured in China. (New York Times,  January 30, 2010) 
                                                 
6  It refers to energy-generation installations which are not state-owned. 
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Clean renewable energy strategy emphasizes a sustainable growth path based on 
equity is leading the transition to knowledge and information economy. When 
referring to China’s alternative renewable energy policy, some studies have 
shown that China is facing both opportunities and challenges. The potential 
opportunities are plenty, such as solar energy, wind energy, biomass energy, 
small hydropower, geothermal energy, ocean energy, etc; whereas the 
challenges are apparent as well, such as the lack of coordination and policy 
consistency, weakness and incompleteness in incentive system, lack of 
innovation in regional policy, immature financial system for renewable energy 
projects and the limited investment in research and development of renewable 
energy (Zhang, Peidong, et al 2007). There is still a long way to go before 
China’s renewable energy market becomes mature and socially and culturally 
embedded. 
 
V. Conclusion remarks: challenges and optimism ahead 
The objective of the paper aims at providing a framework of critically 
understanding China’s  transformation from a self-reliance development path to 
a “market-driven” dependent growth strategy. The paper’s emphasis is on the 
economic and ecological consequence of China’s insatiable demand for energy 
driven by the growth-based industrialization policy in the past decades. This 
paper argues that since the beginning of the 21st century, energy has become a 
key concern on the agenda of China’s economic and foreign policy-making 
calculations. Among China’s core national interests – securing energy resources, 
gaining market access and political recognition – energy security is the top 
priority. It is expected with the rapid economic development and the 
improvement of people’s living standard, energy demand in China will 
unavoidably continue to increase, which will be inseparable with its 
environmental problems, such as the emission of sulfur dioxide and carbon 
dioxide. Above all, the western definition of “market-driven” economies in 
energy is questionable in China such that different definitions and meanings are 
need for “market” and therefore “capitalism”. 
  
Chinese policymakers understand the fact that due to a growing need for and 
even competition over energy resources and maritime transportation security, 
global resource-based competition and geo-territorial claims on sea areas and 
shelves will become harsh and could lead to armed confrontations. In order to 
understand the implication of the underlying dynamics of international political 
economy in resource-rich regions, it is of great importance to understand the 
source of international economic competition and conflict for access to 
energy and natural resources and to understand the interaction between 
individual national interests. The international geo-politics and geo-economics 
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in the acquisition and distribution of states’ wealth and power are manifested in 
their respective country’s economic and foreign policies. 
 
China’s soaring demand for energy in connection with its export-oriented 
economy poses a variety of new challenges for its economic and foreign policy. 
Hence the country will be more and more dependent on the purchase of natural 
resources abroad for sustaining its economic development. Any crisis to China’s 
access to overseas resource and maritime shipping routes will have a negative 
impact on China’s growth and trade-dependent economy. China will endeavour 
to protect the strategic areas concerning its national interest. It has no choice. In 
recent years China’s energy diplomacy in the context of the political economy of 
global energy developments has drawn the attention of the West, especially in 
connection with the sensitive regions, such as the Middle East, Central Asia, 
Latin America and Africa. As one Chinese scholar bluntly states, “The 
determining factor shaping the rise and fall of a country ultimately is not just the 
size of its total economic volume but also the strategic ability of the country; 
that is, the ability to use national forces to achieve political goals” (Zhang, 2006: 
22).  
 
However, despite the above global reality described by this realist perception, 
China’s deep sense of its energy insecurity and vulnerability is changing its 
development policy towards clean and renewable energy. China is accelerating 
R&D on renewable energy supply and advanced energy conservation-based 
techniques and products; it is making necessary structural changes in industrial 
and agricultural sectors moving to non-energy intensive industries. Furthermore, 
China is trying to rely primarily on domestic resources while strengthen 
mutually beneficial international energy cooperation. The optimism that China is 
presenting to the world is not groundless. China is not only one of the world’s 
leading producers of renewable energy, but also is over-taking more developed 
countries in exploiting valuable economic opportunities, creating green-collar 
jobs and leading development of critical low carbon technologies. Such 
optimism in China’s own “green revolution” is also confirmed by the front page 
of a recent report by Climate Group (2009), “As one of the world’s major 
economic powers, China will have to be at the forefront of this journey. This 
report shows that it can be.” Nevertheless, China still has a long way to meet its 
policy objectives on energy and environmental sustainability. Due to its size and 
population the consequences of failure in China’s case are much more serious 
than many other counties. China should not be left struggling alone on the road 
to optimism; and the whole world must pay more attention to China. World 
peace and a sustainable planet depend on global harmony and collaboration 
beyond convention competition over supply and demand. 
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